All terms

    Supply-chain Levels for Software Artifacts

    OpenSSF framework defining progressive levels of build-system integrity for software supply chain security, focused on tamper-resistance of the build.

    Reviewed by Christian Espinosa, Founder, Blue Goat CyberLast reviewed June 20, 2026

    Definition

    SLSA (Supply-chain Levels for Software Artifacts) is an Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) specification that defines four progressive maturity levels for the integrity of a software build process. Each level adds requirements: SLSA Level 1 asks for a scripted build and provenance; Level 2 requires a hosted build service that generates signed provenance; Level 3 requires the build environment to be hardened and non-falsifiable; Level 4 (still evolving) requires a hermetic, two-person-reviewed build. SLSA's contribution is provenance, verifiable attestations of how, where, and from what sources an artifact was built.
    What the regulation says
    Not yet directly cited by FDA, but referenced by CISA's Software Supply Chain Security guidance and accepted as evidence under NIST SSDF practice PS.3 (Verify Third-Party Software) and PO.3 (Implement Supporting Toolchains). Expect SLSA references to appear in future FDA cybersecurity guidance updates.

    What this means in practice

    SLSA complements SBOM. An SBOM tells you what is inside an artifact; SLSA provenance tells you whether the artifact was built from the sources it claims, in a build environment that wasn't tampered with. For medical device manufacturers concerned about XZ-Utils-style supply-chain compromises, SLSA Level 2+ for first-party builds and SLSA-verifiable provenance from upstream component suppliers is the strongest available defense.

    Examples

    • A medical device manufacturer achieves SLSA Level 2 for their firmware build process by using a cloud-hosted build service that automatically generates and signs provenance attestations for each release.
    • During a pre-market submission, a medical device developer includes SLSA Level 3 attestations for critical software components, demonstrating that the code was built in a hardened, tamper-resistant environment.
    • A hospital procurement team requires suppliers of network-connected diagnostic equipment to provide SLSA-verifiable provenance for all included open source libraries, ensuring that these components were built from their stated sources without compromise.
    Common pitfalls
    • •Equating SBOM with supply-chain security, without provenance, an SBOM can be fabricated.
    • •Targeting SLSA Level 4 immediately, most organizations start at Level 1-2 and progress as their build infrastructure matures.
    • •Ignoring third-party SLSA provenance when selecting components, the framework's value compounds when consumed and produced.

    Frequently asked questions

    An SBOM (Software Bill of Materials) tells you what components are inside a software artifact, but it does not tell you whether the artifact was actually built from the sources it claims or whether the build process was tampered with; SLSA (Supply-chain Levels for Software Artifacts) addresses that gap by defining verifiable provenance, cryptographically signed attestations of how, where, and from what source an artifact was built.
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    Sources

    3 sources

    Every citation below opens the original document. Each is graded against our source-tier hierarchy so you can see what rests on binding law versus commentary.

    Tier 2Regulator guidance and consensus· 3
    Link health: 3 verified· last checked 2026-06-20
    OpenSSF·1CISA·1FDA·1
    1. 1
      SLSA Specification
      Tier 2 Verified
      OpenSSFslsa.dev
    2. 2
      CISA - Healthcare and Public Health Sector
      Tier 2 Verified
      CISAcisa.gov
    3. 3
      FDA - Cybersecurity for Medical Devices
      Tier 2 Verified
      FDAfda.gov

    Inline markers like [1] jump to the matching reference above.